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I. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER
I would like to put the present debate over the 1972 Anti-Ballis-
tic Missile (ABM) Treaty into some historical perspective.' From
time to time, the debate associated with the ratification of a particular
treaty moves beyond the merits of the policy, or particular issue under
consideration, to an argument about the treaty process itself, espe-
cially the correct interpretation of the treaty power as set out in arti-
cle II, section 2, of the Constitution.2 Debate over the treaty process
* Harold Hongju Koh is an Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School. Professor
Koh practiced law in Washington, D.C., 1982-1983, and was an attorney-advisor in the Office
of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice, 1983-1985.
** John Nowak is a Professor of Law at the University of Illinois College of Law.
Professor Nowak was a law clerk for Justice Walter V. Schaefer, Supreme Court of Illinois,
1971-1972.
*** Grover Joseph Rees is Chief Justice of the High Court of American Samoa. Chief
Justice Rees was Special Counsel for Judicial Selection, 1985-1986; Special Assistant to the
Attorney-General, United States Department of Justice, 1985; Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Texas, Austin, 1979-1986.
**** Abraham D. Sofaer is the Legal Adviser to the Department of State. He was a United
States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York, 1979-1985; Professor of Law,
Columbia University, 1969-1979; and Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of
New York, 1967-1969.
1. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
2. U.S. CONSr. art II, § 2.
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often distorts that process, disrupts accepted treaty practice, and even
threatens the utility of the treaty making mechanism.
This hypothesis is supported by recent experience. The Presi-
dent's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has been the subject of exten-
sive public and congressional analysis scrutiny. Another
controversial subject has been the proper interpretation of the 1972
ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty became a major issue after this
administration concluded, in late 1985, that a broader interpretation
was fully justified by the treaty, and its negotiating record.3 If imple-
mented, this broader interpretation would allow increased flexibility
in developing and testing mobile systems or components based on
what the treaty calls "other physical principles,"4 which I understand
to be principles other than those used in 1972 ABM systems.
The administration's legal judgment-based on painstaking
study-is that the Soviets did not agree in the ABM Treaty to be
bound by U.S. proposals that would have entirely banned the develop-
ment and testing of mobile devices based on "other physical princi-
ples," including space-based devices.5 Despite this fact, however, the
President has not implemented the so-called broader interpretation,
nor has he decided when, and under what conditions, he would imple-
ment it. He has promised that he would consult Congress before
making any decision to implement the broad interpretation of the
ABM treaty. The nation, nonetheless, has been subjected to a massive
dispute over both the merits of the broader interpretation, and the
President's power to implement it without the Senate's consent.
While it might be tempting to claim that this ABM debate
reflects some unprecedented, unjustifiable, and incomprehensible
aberration in American constitutional history, in actuality it illus-
trates a recurring phenomenon in the historic tug-of-war between the
President and the Senate over the treaty power. The Senate has
guarded and aggressively expanded its prerogatives in the treaty pro-
cess, whenever it has been politically convenient to do so. Technical
issues of treaty law and questions of competence become the surro-
gates for policy disputes, subverting the constitutionally mandated
process of Senate advice and consent to treaty ratification. Professor
Holt, a scholar of the history of American treaty law, described this
phenomenon years ago. He stated:
[W]hen a treaty is the subject of a contest in the Senate the consti-
3. THE ABM INTERPRETATION RESOLUTION: REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. REP. No. 100-164, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 28 (1987).
4. See ABM Treaty, supra note 1, at 3456.
5. See ABM INTERPRETATION RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 26.
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tutional distribution of the treaty-making power between President
and Senate becomes involved and the treaty is certain to be
attacked on the grounds that the prerogatives of the Senate are
being invaded by the President.6
In 1888, for example, when anti-British sentiment was high in
America, the Senate considered a proposed treaty with the United
Kingdom concerning the Northeast fisheries.7 The treaty offered a
peaceful solution to the conflict between the two countries, but its
opponents killed it in the Senate on a strictly partisan basis." The
treaty was attacked on the grounds that the President had failed to get
the Senate's consent in selecting the persons he chose to negotiate the
treaty. Senator Chandler said a treaty so negotiated was "a gross vio-
lation of the Constitution, wilfully, recklessly, and defiantly perpe-
trated; and the Senate might well have refused on this ground even to
consider the terms of a treaty thus first introduced into its presence." 9
It was clear in 1888, as it is today, that Senator Chandler's attack on
the treaty was unjustified. Presidents long before and after 1888 have
employed treaty negotiators without seeking the Senate's advice and
consent. This attack illustrates how the Senate will occasionally
advance some meritless restriction, supposedly found within the
treaty power, to defeat a treaty disliked for its substantive policy.' 0
The Treaty of Versailles' I provides another illustration. Various
senators proposed a number of killer reservations to ratification of the
treaty that, in effect, constituted rejection of the treaty.' 2 Senator
Sherman argued that the President was proposing to allocate powers
to a foreign institution that were inconsistent with the constitutional
authority of the United States government. 13 Similarly, Senator Reed
argued that calls for freedom of transit, and for equitable treatment of
international commerce, were unconstitutional. He stated: "What
can it mean, except that the League [of Nations] proposes to regulate
international commerce as the Congress now regulates interstate com-
merce? How can Congress regulate commerce with foreign nations
and at the same time the League be the instrumentality to secure equi-
table treatment?"
One proposed reservation would have required that anyone sent
6. W. HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 145 (1933).
7. S. EXEC. Doc. No. 176, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1888).
8. Id.
9. 50 CONG. REC. 19, 6355 (1888).
10. See generally H. WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
(1967).
11. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry's T.S. 188.
12. 66 CONG. REC. 58, 8767-69 (1919).
13. Id. at 8770.
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to the League of Nations as a participant representing the United
States be appointed by the Senate itself, and sent by Congress, not by
the President. 4 Another reservation, actually adopted, empowered
the United States to withdraw unilaterally from the League and pro-
vided: "the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its
international obligations and all its obligations under the said cove-
nant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United
States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the
United States."1I- This passage reflected the Senate's intent to keep
the President out of the process of terminating a treaty, a process that
has historically been squarely within his authority.
A similar fight took place in 1946, in connection with the
approval of an executive agreement between the United States and
Canada, relating to the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Deep Waterway. 6
The President's legal adviser at that time, former Judge Hackworth,
was cited at the Senate hearings as stating that the St. Lawrence Deep
Waterway plan could be adopted by legislation, even though it could
not get the two-thirds vote necessary for a treaty. 7 The chairman of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations asked Hackworth how
the Senate could do by law what really should be done through a
treaty. Would the consent of the Congress "make the leopard change
its spots?" With his usual intellectual candor, Hackworth replied,
"The leopard would change its spots if Congress chose to approve this
agreement as legislation. After all, if both the political branches of
the Government agreed this was the way to handle the matter, who
was to say it wasn't?" Senator Bailey said he found that explanation
"as convincing as the difference between a four-legged horse and a
quadruped in the nature of a horse."
In reaction to this testimony by the President's legal adviser, the
subcommittee called Professor Borchard from Yale, who offered his
legal opinion that the St. Lawrence project could be concluded only
by treaty. Borchard urged the Senate to stand on its constitutional
prerogatives and warned against giving the House of Representatives
any role in treatymaking.' 8 He stated:
In fact, to me, it is very important that the Senate retain its power
14. Id. at 8777.
15. Id.
16. A Joint Resolution Approving the Agreement between the United States and Canada
Relating to the Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence Seaway Basin: Hearings on S. J. Res. 104 Before a
Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 372 (1946)
[hereinafter Joint Resolution].
17. Id. at 1312.
18. Id. at 1313.
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over treaties. It is the only check over a somewhat uncontrollable
Executive that we have; and if the Senate abandons its power I am
doubtful of the future of the country .... To approve... [this
legislation] you have got to approve abandoning the Constitution.
Once you approve this legislation you have cut the Nation's last
defense, and you will drain away the Senate's ratifying power over
treaties.19
The legislation was approved despite Borchard's gross exaggeration.2'
The recent conflict between the Senate and the administration
concerning the ABM Treaty is also a political contest, in which some
senators have gone beyond debating policy and charged the President
and his legal adviser with attempting to violate established treaty
principles. In fact, members of the Senate are challenging basic
assumptions and recasting basic treaty principles. The so-called
"ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution," 21 recently proposed by the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, seeks to require that the
President continue to adhere to the restrictive interpretation of the
ABM Treaty, by saying that the President can interpret treaties only
as they were understood by the Senate when it voted.
We told the committee about Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
States,22 which holds that the Senate cannot affect the interpretation
of a treaty, via a resolution passed after the Senate has given its advice
and consent. The committee majority, nevertheless, has adopted a
resolution that concludes that the development and testing of ABM
systems based on other physical principles is inconsistent with the
Senate's understanding at the time of ratification. Furthermore, the
committee majority concludes that, according to section 8 of the reso-
lution, such activity "would be inconsistent with the provisions of the
Treaty and would require an amendment to the Treaty. ' 23 The com-
mittee asserts that "this section does not constitute a Senate interpre-
tation of the ABM Treaty. The interpretation of treaties is the
President's prerogative, so long as he interprets a treaty within consti-
tutional parameters."24 Notwithstanding the committee's assertion,
section 8 is a declaration as to how the ABM Treaty should be inter-
preted. As such, it is an unprecedented interference with the Presi-
19. Id. at 1313-19.
20. See Joint Resolution, supra note 16, at 379.
21. S. Res. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S3140-45 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1987).
22. 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
23. See S. Res. 167, supra note 21, at 3140-41, §§ 2, 8(2).
24. See ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 46.
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dent's power to interpret treaties, and is inconsistent with treaty
practice and Supreme Court precedent.
The same theory of treaty interpretation is implied in Senator
Sam Nunn's observation on our treatymaking process. He asserts
that the Soviet Union, and other foreign countries, understand our
treatymaking process so well that when an executive official says
something to a senate committee about the meaning of that treaty, we
can confront the Soviet negotiators thereafter and say: "I know you
read our senate committee reports and our testimony, and therefore,
you are bound by these interpretations because you didn't object."
There is absolutely no basis for this interpretation of the treaty
power. The Soviets, themselves, have flatly contradicted Senator
Nunn. Ambassador Gerard Smith, one of the ABM Treaty negotia-
tors, testified in the 1972 ratification hearings on the meaning of the
word "development." United States negotiator Colonel Charles Fitz-
gerald later argued to the Soviets, in 1981, that they had heard the
Smith testimony about the meaning of the word "development" and
had not objected. The Soviet negotiator, in effect, replied: "Why
should we have to object about something that goes on in your inter-
nal processes? We are bound only by the treaty and what we said to
each other about it." Thus, the theory that the President must inter-
pret treaties in accordance with the understanding of the Senate when
it voted has been rejected by both the United States and the Soviet
Union.25
To conclude, both sides in this debate are going to behave the
way senators and executive officials have behaved throughout Ameri-
can history: arguing about the treaty process itself in an effort to
advance their respective political positions. But let us keep our wits
about ourselves. Let us not get carried away in overstatement and
political rhetoric. This is a hard fought debate over the President's
power. At a minimum, let us wait until the President attempts to
exercise power before we restrain him. Particularly, let us not
restrain his ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union. The number
of strategic weapons that will be established by future treaties will be
determined, in large part, by the President's strength at the bargaining
table.
II. HAROLD HONGJU KOH
26
It seems particularly appropriate and timely that the Federalist
25. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, The ABM Treaty Studies
PART II: RATIFICATION PROCESS 41 (May 11, 1987).
26. Portions of these remarks have been incorporated, in modified form, in Koh, Why the
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Society should address the subject of the treaty power. For I can
think of no area of separation of powers law in which recent executive
practice has moved further from the original intent of the framers.
Judge Sofaer has presented you with one version of how the treaty
power has evolved over our Nation's 200-year constitutional history.
Let me present a somewhat less sanguine, neo-Federalist account of
what has happened to the treaty power over the last two centuries,
and during the Reagan administration in particular.
My thesis has two points. First, during the last 200 years, but
particularly since this administration took office, the executive branch
has increasingly dominated the treaty process to the near exclusion of
the other two branches of government. By the "treaty process," I
refer to three different phases: first, "treatymaking;" second,
"treatybreaking;" and third, "treatybending." Treatybending
includes the type of treaty modification that occurred in April of
1984, when the executive branch temporarily modified our acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.27
It also encompasses the type of treaty "reinterpretation" that the
administration has advocated in its attempt to accommodate the
ABM Treaty with the development and testing of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI).2"
My second point is that the executive branch's current domina-
tion of the treaty process, with only limited participation by the other
branches, hardly complies with the framers' original intent regarding
treatymaking. This result has done a disservice to the long-term
interests of the institutional presidency and the nation, even if it has
appeared to serve President Reagan's short-term interests.
A. The Federalist Vision of the Treaty Power
To support my. thesis, let me briefly review the framers' original
intent with respect to these three aspects of the treaty power. In the
area of treatymaking, the historical record suggests strongly that the
framers drafted the Constitution with two goals in mind: first, to
establish the supremacy of the federal treaty power over actions of the
States;29 and second, to ensure that within the federal government,
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE
L.J. 1255 (1988).
27. See 61 Stat. 1218 (1946) (initial U.S. acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction). The
United States's modification of its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction occurred
on April 6, 1984. See Letter from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Secretary-General of
the United Nations Javier Perez de Cuellar (April 6, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 670 (1984).
28. See supra notes 3-5, 21-25 and accompanying text.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; art. VI, § 2.
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both the President and the Senate would participate in the treaty pro-
cess before a treaty was concluded. 30 At various points during the
Constitutional Convention, the delegates considered giving the treaty
power solely to the Senate, or solely to the President. But Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay all urged the Convention to adopt the current ver-
sion of article II, which gives the President the "[plower, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur."'3' In James Wilson's words,
this compromise was to guarantee that "[n]either the President nor
the Senate, solely, can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each
other, and are so balanced as to produce security to the people." 32
Similarly, Hamilton concluded: "It must indeed be clear, to a demon-
stration, that the joint possession of the [treaty] power in question, by
the [P]resident and [S]enate, would afford a greater prospect of secur-
ity than the separate possession of it by either of them."
33
With regard to treatybreaking and treatybending, both the text
and the constitutional history of article II are silent. But a careful
reading of Federalist No. 6431 suggests that the constitutional design
reflected not only a legal judgment by the framers, but also their pru-
dential judgment about what a wise treaty process would be. In their
view, the process that would best balance the working operation of
the political departments would allow the President to take the lead in
treaty matters, but would require him to consult with the Senate. In
John Jay's words, this collaboration "provides that our negotiation
for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from tal-
ents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations [of the Sen-
ate], on the one hand; and from secrecy and dispatch [secured by
Presidential action], on the other."
35
During our Constitution's first one and one-half centuries, the
major debates swirled around the supremacy of federal treaties and
agreements over State law-a dispute that was not settled by the
Supreme Court until the 1940's.36 With the rise of the United
Nations and Bretton Woods systems, however, by the 1950's and
1960's, the battle for dominance over treatymaking within the federal
30. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
31. Id.
32. II THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 507 (J. Elliot ed. 1896) (statement of James Wilson).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (A. Hamilton).
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay).
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 331 (J. Jay) (W. Kendall & G. Carey ed. 1966).
36. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
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government had taken center stage. And by the late 1960's, the Presi-
dent had largely won that battle by using a variety of techniques, par-
ticularly the executive agreement, to lead the United States into the
era of multilateralism.
Two crucial features of this era are worth mentioning. First,
with few exceptions, Congress authorized the presidential practices in
the 1950's and 1960's: by Senate ratification, by prior or subsequent
statutory approval, or by the appropriation of funds to implement
United States participation in international organizations. Second,
the Supreme Court ultimately validated this use of executive agree-
ments on the merits, beginning with its 1937 and 1942 decisions,
respectively, in United States v. Belmont 37 and United States v. Pink,3
and concluding in 1981 with Dames & Moore v. Regan.39
B. Recent Executive Branch Treaty Practices
When we look at the late 1970's and early 1980's, we witness a
trend strikingly contrary to what we saw in the 1950's and 1960's.
This recent trend reveals America's flight from, rather than toward,
multilateral cooperation and international organizations. For if the
1950's was America's era of treatymaking, then the 1980's-the Rea-
gan years-have just as surely been its years of treatybreaking and
treatybending. As in the 1950's, the President has increasingly led the
way in treaty affairs, generally without securing prior congressional
consent, by developing a whole new range of treatybreaking and
treatybending techniques.
These treatybreaking and treatybending years of the 1980's differ
from the treatymaking years of the 1950's in three crucial aspects.
First, in contrast to the 1950's, when the President used his power to
enhance multilateral cooperation, the 1980's have seen the President
terminate or break existing commitments unilaterally without con-
sulting either the Congress or our treaty partners. Second, to a large
extent, neither the Senate alone nor the Congress acting as a whole
have authorized what the President has done. And third, the
Supreme Court has not validated the President's techniques of treaty-
breaking or treatybending on the merits.
This third point becomes clear when one examines the Supreme
Court's 1979 decision in Goldwater v. Carter.' In Goldwater, the
Court refused to hear Senator Barry Goldwater's challenge to Presi-
37. 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (upholding the Litvinov Assignment).
38. 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (upholding the Litvinov Assignment).
39. 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding the Iran hostages executive agreement).
40. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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dent Carter's decision to terminate unilaterally our mutual defense
treaty with Taiwan.41 Only one justice voted to uphold the Presi-
dent's authority on the merits, and even then, only because the case
involved the President's plenary power regarding recognition.4" Nev-
ertheless, the Reagan administration has read Goldwater to stand for
much more. After Goldwater, if the President has not liked a treaty,
he has terminated it unilaterally without congressional consent. In
this way, President Reagan terminated our acceptance of the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),43 our
bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN)
with Nicaragua," and our membership in UNESCO.45 When a
treaty's terms have required the United States to give six-months'
notice before terminating it, the President has evaded that restraint by
purporting to "modify" the treaty temporarily without congressional
consent, as occurred, for example, when President Reagan "modified"
our acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction just prior to our
being sued there by Nicaragua."
When the President has sought to ratify a treaty without really
ratifying it, he has used the technique of non-ratification ratification-
what I like to call the "Swiss cheese ratification." In such a case, the
President submits the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, but
adds so many declarations, reservations, and understandings to it that
the exceptions effectively gut the acceptance.47 Recently, the execu-
tive branch has even used new executive agreements to undercut
41. See Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-Republic of China, 6 U.S.T.
433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
42. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. See Letter from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Secretary-General of the United
Nations Javier Perez de Cuellar (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
44. See Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1199 (D. Mass. 1986)
(dismissing challenge to State Department's notice of termination of Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S.
No. 4024), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
45. Constitution of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
November 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 276, 300; AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT
DOCUMENTS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9441, U.S. INTENTIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM
UNESCO 283 (1985) (Letter from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to Director General of
UNESCO Amadou Mahtar M'Bow (Dec. 28, 1983) (notice of U.S. intent to terminate its
participation in UNESCO effective Dec. 31, 1984)).
46. See supra note 27.
47. See, e.g., the conditions attached to the U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention,
described in Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
80 AM. J. INT'L L. 612-22 (1986). Although some of these conditions were added at the
urging of the Senate, the Reagan administration offered the Genocide Convention for advice
and consent with more conditions than had been offered by any prior Administration. The
Genocide Convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 9, 1948. See
Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278.
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existing multilateral treaties. This happened, for example, when the
Commerce Secretary entered a side deal with Japan, authorizing that
country's fishermen to evade the "zero quota" that the International
Whaling Commission had previously imposed against the killing of
whales.48
On the treatymaking side, this administration has been even
more creative in developing techniques to amend or create treaty obli-
gations without congressional review. When the President has not
wanted to be bound by a multilateral treaty, he has refused to ratify it
and then has selectively complied with various provisions as a matter
of customary international law. This "line-item veto" approach to
treaty compliance was pursued with respect to the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention,49 and
until last year, with respect to the warhead limits in the SALT II
Treaty.50 When the President has sought to evade congressional
authority with respect to international trade, he has made an agree-
ment and called it something other than an agreement, such as the
"voluntary unilateral export restraints" that were concluded regard-
ing Japan's import quota deals on cars and semiconductors., 1
When the President has wanted to amend an existing treaty-the
1972 ABM Treaty 52-to accommodate the development and testing
of "Star Wars," he has done so by "reinterpreting it," without previ-
ously consulting with Congress, our Soviet treaty partners, or our
Western allies. After interpreting the ABM Treaty narrowly during
the entire first term of his administration, the President has now given
the same language a broader reading, relying on a secret negotiating
record not transmitted to the Senate when it first advised and con-
sented to the treaty in 1972. 53 In short, during the last seven years,
48. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 241-44 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the deal with Japan).
49. President Reagan refused to sign the United Nations Convention on The Law of the
Sea, opened for signature December 10, 1982, multilateral U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), but then announced that the U.S. would comply with a
selected number of its provisions as a matter of customary international law. See United States
Ocean Policy, 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983).
50. S. REP. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979). See Over the TOP, The U.S. violates
SALT II, TIME, Dec. 8, 1986, at 43 (describing U.S. decision to discontinue observance of
SALT II Treaty).
51, See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 617-22 (2d ed. 1986) (autos); see also 25 I.L.M. 1408, 1409 (1986)
(semiconductors).
52. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
53. See THE ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION RESOLUTION, S. REp. No. 164, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 28 (1987).
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we have witnessed a dramatic executive effort to aggrandize the treaty
process, and to exclude Congress from all three phases of it.
C. Evaluating Recent Treaty Practices
Even this brief historical review should make it clear that this
administration's approach to the treaty power has strayed a great dis-
tance from the original Federalist vision of a constitutional process
that involves both the Senate and the President acting together. The
executive branch's unilateral acts, without congressional authoriza-
tion or judicial validation, fit uneasily within both the framers' legal
vision and prudential vision of a regime in which the President and
the Senate "act as checks upon each other ... so balanced as to pro-
duce security to the people."54 Even if the executive branch's rejec-
tion of the Federalist vision has not been good for Congress, I wish I
could say that it has been good for the country or for the executive
branch. Unfortunately, I believe that the net effect has been quite the
opposite.
We cannot forget that the United States is a party to a network of
closely interconnected treaties. For that reason, apparently hasty
administration decisions to bend or break one treaty have forced it
into a vicious cycle of multiple treaty violations. For example, the
administration's effort to divest the ICJ of jurisdiction over the Nica-
ragua case" through treaty modification-which would have been
unnecessary had the Court truly lacked jurisdiction-weakened our
jurisdictional case and may have contributed to our loss at the juris-
dictional phase.-6 This loss, in turn, prompted the administration to
withdraw from the case and later to break our acceptance of the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 57 This course of action has now
culminated in the Court's adverse judgment against us on the merits,
and Nicaragua's new claim that the U.S. has breached its obligation
to respect international judgments.58
Similarly, we premised our original decision to sign the SALT II
Treaty with the Soviet Union-a treaty that sets numerical limits for
offensive weapons--on the assumption that both parties would abide
by the ABM Treaty, a pact barring future development and testing of
territorial defensive weapons. 59 The underlying premise was that
54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
55. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169, 1984 I.C.J. 392, 1986 I.C.J. 14.
56. See Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 442.
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
58. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
59. See supra note 52.
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without territorial defensive weapons, neither side would need to
engage in an offensive weapons buildup. By unilaterally reinter-
preting the ABM Treaty to permit our development and testing of
precisely such a defensive system, the Strategic Defense Initiative, the
administration undercut its ability to challenge Soviet violations of
the ABM Treaty, forced its own decision to abandon the limits on
offensive weapons in SALT II, and prompted the Soviet Union's
demand for strict compliance with the ABM treaty as a condition to
entering into any START treaty on the reduction of long-range
nuclear weapons.6° In short, this wave upon wave of U.S.
treatybreaking and treatybending has created a worldwide impression
of a United States that is contemptuous of international treaties and
institutions. Unfortunately, this negative impression has arisen at
precisely the time when we need to mobilize those same institutions to
help us address problems that we simply cannot solve by ourselves:
for example, trade imbalances, currency coordination, international
terrorism, joint sanctions against Iran and Libya, and security policy
in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.
Similarly, the administration's decisions to avoid consulting Con-
gress before modifying, breaking, or amending treaties have alienated
that institution at the time that the President needs it most to imple-
ment the most basic elements of his foreign policy. In the area of
arms control, the ABM Treaty interpretation battle between the Sen-
ate and the administration has caused at least five counterproductive
effects for the Executive. First, it has alienated key Senators who are
crucial to the ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty,61 or the two nuclear test ban treaties that are currently
on the Hill.62 Second, it has invited other Senators to delay ratifica-
tion of the INF Treaty, by calling for the negotiating record of that
treaty, and by threatening to attach understandings to its key provi-
sions. Third, it has threatened to make major inroads into the appro-
priations of the Department of Defense, by encouraging both the
House and the Senate to pass versions of the Department of Defense
Authorization Act that require the President to respect the narrow
ABM Treaty interpretation. Fourth, it has jeopardized the principle
60. See Mann, Moscow Summit Dims Chances for START Treaty This Year, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 6, 1988, at 18.
61. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 27
I.L.M. 84 (1988).
62. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, July 3, 1974, 13 I.L.M.
906 (1974); Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, 15 I.L.M. 891 (1976).
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of executive privilege by triggering waivers of the privilege on a whole
range of secret negotiating documents. And fifth, it has limited the
ability of future arms control negotiators to engage in off-the-record
negotiations that might lead to breakthroughs in future arms talks.
The administration's position before the International Court of
Justice in Nicaragua v. United States63 has hamstrung its ability to
participate constructively in the Central American peace process.
Similarly, the Iran-Contra affair has damaged the President's ability
to secure additional Contra funding."' In the area of international
trade, where the President operates largely pursuant to authority dele-
gated to him by Congress, Congress' growing distrust of the President
has led to a new trade bill that imposes unprecedented constraints on
the President's freedom to negotiate in the new General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) round and may still lead to the scut-
tling of the United States-Canadian Free Trade Agreement.6"
Perhaps most troubling, the administration's recent treaty con-
duct has considerably damaged the twin goals of multilateral coopera-
tion at an international level and congressional-executive partnership
at the domestic level-the vision that has guided both our economic
and our political foreign policy in the postwar era. In the realm of
international trade affairs, this administration still recognizes that
world economic interdependence demands a bipartisan commitment
to multilateral cooperation, in order to mitigate self-destructive cycles
of trade retaliation and to promote world welfare through trade
expansion. I find it peculiar that the administration has not respected
fully the same logic when conducting its political and military affairs.
D. Conclusion
In sum, the administration's recent efforts to expand executive
power in the treaty area have disserved the very ends that those efforts
were designed to promote-the preservation of executive power in
foreign affairs and the preservation of America's ability to lead in the
community of nations. The Federalist Society has commonly applied
three standards to judge both the constitutionality and the wisdom of
government conduct: first, the fidelity of that conduct to the Federal-
ist vision; second, the impact of that conduct on executive power; and
third, the extent to which that conduct furthers the national interest.
63. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169, 1984 I.C.J. 392, 1986 I.C.J. 14.
64. See Pearson, The Iran Crisis May Doom The Reagan Doctrine-As Well As The
Contras, Bus. WK., Jan. 5, 1987, at 51.
65. See France, Why Congress is Hobbling Reagan's Drive for Free Trade, Bus. WK., May
26, 1986, at 56.
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Under each of these three standards, this administration's treaty prac-
tices have failed.
Unlike some, I do not believe that the framers' original intent
must be slavishly followed. I do believe, however, that there was con-
siderable wisdom in the framers' original insight that both the Presi-
dent and Congress should play an important role in the treaty
process. Of course, the President must speak for the Nation and lead
it in its external affairs. He should do so, however, only after close
consultation with Congress, which is closer to the American people
and more attuned to how foreign policy initiatives will affect other
areas of national concern. It is unfortunate that this administration's
failure to heed the framers' legal and prudential insights has helped to
hamper the President in his relations with both Congress and our
treaty partners at this very critical time in our nation's history.
III. JOHN NOWAK
I will leave it to others to debate the constitutionally "correct,"
or "wise," division of decisionmaking responsibility between the Pres-
ident and Congress concerning the ratification, interpretation, or ter-
mination of treaties, or the use of executive agreements as alternatives
to treaties. Instead, I would like to focus on judicial interpretation of
the Constitution and the role of the judiciary in limiting either presi-
dential, or congressional, action in the area of the treaty power.
We know, but sometimes forget, that there are really two ques-
tions that should be addressed by a Justice when he considers a con-
stitutional issue. First, the Justice must ask: What is the "correct"
interpretation of the constitutional provisions at issue? The Justice
may decide this question using his knowledge of the history of the
Constitution, his analysis of our democratic process, or his assessment
of the most just result. Anything goes when answering the first ques-
tion. Second, the Justice must ask: Is the basis for the constitutional
rule so clear that the judiciary is justified in overturning the actions of
the democratically elected branches of government? This second
question forces the Justice to decide whether he is confusing political
philosophy with constitutional analysis. This dual-question approach
to constitutional decisionmaking is especially important when the
judiciary reviews the scope of the treaty power, or reviews presidential
or congressional action in foreign affairs.
Historical evidence of the intentions of the framers of the Consti-
tution cannot serve as the basis for judicial restriction of either presi-
dential or congressional power in foreign affairs. A Supreme Court
decision interpreting the scope of the treaty power based on "history"
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or "original intentions" serves only to mask the political philosophy
of the Justices and their inability to decide such issues with sound
analytical reasoning. History provides no answers to such problems,
even though there are sources available to "prove" constitutional
principles, thereby justifying any and all judicial rulings. Justices
favoring broad presidential power in foreign affairs could support
their position by citing the articles written by Alexander Hamilton,
under the name Pacificus.66 Those Justices who believe the nation
would be served best by a significant legislative role in foreign affairs
and a limited executive authority could support their position with
articles written by James Madison, under the name Helvidius.67 Those
preferring to keep the judiciary out of all issues regarding treaties and
foreign affairs can cite passages from John Marshall's opinion in Mar-
bury v. Madison.68 Finally, those Justices asserting that there is his-
torical support for a judicial role in resolving issues on the treaty
power and disputes between the executive and legislative branches in
foreign affairs can cite the fact that more than a dozen framers of the
Constitution were members of the Congress that passed the Judiciary
Act of 1789.69 The Act gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over
cases in which treaties had been invalidated by a lower court.7°
The judiciary can avoid both the problem of historical uncer-
tainty and the tendency to confuse personal, political views with con-
stitutional analysis by separating the constitutional issues that may
arise in cases involving treaty power and foreign affairs into three cat-
egories: (1) the federalism issues; (2) the separation of powers issues;
and (3) the enforcement of specific limitations on the federal govern-
ment's powers that are set out in the text of the Constitution, or its
amendments. The Justices cannot avoid cases that involve treaty
power or foreign affairs questions, but they can properly limit the
judicial role in these areas by using this "categories approach."
How would the Justices use these categories to decide cases? The
judiciary should review treaties, executive agreements, or legislation
related to foreign affairs only to determine if the government action at
issue violates a specific limitation set out in the text of the Constitu-
66. See A. HAMILTON, Pacificus No. 2, in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (H.
Syrett, ed. 1969) (The "Pacificus" articles are dated between June 29, 1793 and July 27, 1793.).
67. See J. MADISON, Helvidius Essays, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (T. Mason, R.
Rutland, J. Sesson, eds. 1985) (The "Helvidius" articles are dated between August 24, 1793
and September 18, 1793.).
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803) (The opinion indicates that the judiciary should
not inquire into inherently political decisions similar to those in foreign affairs.).
69. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
70. Id. at 73 n.(a).
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tion or its amendments. They should reject any role in reviewing the
constitutionality of any treaty or executive agreement if the argument
for invalidity of the treaty or executive agreement is based on a feder-
alism or separation of powers claim.
The judiciary has no role in reviewing any treaty, executive
agreement, or executive action based on the principles of federalism
because the judge will be unable to define the scope of federal-versus-
state power by any means other than personal political philosophy.
This position was endorsed in 1920 by Justice Holmes, who wrote for
a unanimous Court in Missouri v. Holland.71 Note the date: 1920.
This opinion was not written at a time when the Supreme Court was
endorsing broad federal power over the states in domestic matters.
Rather, it was written at a time when the Court was defending
"state's rights" more strongly than at any other point in our nation's
history. Nevertheless, the Court rejected dicta in cases from the pre-
vious century and found that there was no constitutionally mandated
subject matter restriction on the nature of treaties, or the power of
Congress to enact statutes effectuating treaties.72
The federal government must be able to make or break treaties
and other international agreements without the President or Congress
worrying that the nation's actions in the international arena will be
restricted by judicial conceptions on the relative federal and state
spheres of authority.7 a The judiciary should end debate in this area by
ruling that all federalism questions regarding treaties, executive agree-
ments, or related legislation are political questions.
Does my position mean that the courts would have to uphold an
executive agreement, or treaty, that gives away a portion of the State
of Texas to Mexico? No, because not all issues relating to treaties or
foreign affairs should be ruled to be political questions. The judiciary
must enforce the limitations on federal government power that are
specifically addressed in the Constitution, or its amendments. The
71. 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
72. There had been dicta concerning possible federalism limits on the subject matter of
treaties in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 US. 258, 266-67 (1890). Even at the time that Geofroy was
decided, it seemed to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's view of the federal power in
foreign affairs. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488 (1879); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324-26 (1816). The reserved state powers argument was
clearly rejected in Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
435 (1920).
73. For a more complete examination of the growth of the federal power in international
affairs, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189 (3 ed. 1986)
[hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA]; I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE ch. 6 (Supps. 1986 & 1988)
[hereinafter ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG].
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Constitution specifically denies the federal government the power to
change the boundaries of a state without the state's consent.74 Simi-
larly, the fifth amendment protects each person and State from having
his property taken by the federal government without just compensa-
tion.73 But if the treaty, executive agreement, or related legislation
does not violate such a specific textual limitation on federal power, it
should not be invalidated because of the Justices' view of the proper
sphere of federal authority.
The second category of constitutional attacks on treaties, execu-
tive agreements, or legislation relating to foreign affairs involves ques-
tions concerning the separation of powers principle. The separation
of powers principle is not expressed in the Constitution. Judges have
based this principle on the structure of the Constitution. It is based
on the belief that the excessive blending of powers between the
branches of government blurs the responsibility each branch owes to
the electorate and endangers individual freedoms by permitting the
unchecked exercise of power by each branch of the government. The
Supreme Court's decisions rendered between 1933 and 1936, prohibit-
ing "excessive delegation" of legislative power to the executive branch
were based, in part, on this separation of powers principle.76
There are two reasons for rejecting any separation of powers lim-
itation on presidential or congressional action regarding foreign
affairs. First, articles I and II of the Constitution blend executive and
legislative authority regarding foreign affairs. Legislative participation
in foreign affairs is assured not only by the Senate's role in the ratifica-
tion of treaties, but also by the fact that most treaties cannot be imple-
mented without legislation. The President's article II roles as treaty
negotiator, receiver of ambassadors, and Commander-in-Chief often
depend upon Congress' willingness to exercise its article I powers.
For example, the President through an executive agreement, or the
President and the Senate through a treaty, could make a commitment
to give one billion dollars per year to another country. Yet neither the
executive agreement nor the treaty could authorize the expenditure of
funds because article I requires the House of Representatives' partici-
74. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V (State aid local governments are entitled to the protection of
the just compensation clause.); see United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984).
76. See, e.g., Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Congress
cannot transfer essential legislative functions.); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388




pation in appropriations legislation.7 7 The legislative process set out
in article I, and the specific textual checks on the federal govern-
ment's power in article I, section 9, provide adequate safeguards
against the abuse of power by either the President or the Congress.
Second, issues involving separation of powers in foreign affairs
should be considered political questions. Although this political ques-
tion approach goes beyond prior decisions of the Supreme Court, it is
supported in large measure by the Curtiss-Wright decision.7' That
1936 decision came at a time when the Court was invoking the separa-
tion of powers principle to limit delegations of domestic legislative
authority.79 Similarly, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,s0 the Court rec-
ognized that the judiciary should refrain from invalidating executive
action in foreign affairs in the absence of any clear legislative, or con-
stitutional, check on the executive action.8'
Some persons might argue that this policy of judicial restraint on
political question, separation of powers issues is equivalent to endors-
ing unlimited presidential authority. This argument, however, is not
true. Without intervention by the judiciary, Congress is left with a
variety of powers that, if exercised, will result in a practical demarca-
tion between executive and legislative power. If a clear majority in
Congress disagrees with the terms of an executive agreement, or a
previously ratified treaty, or presidential action based on that treaty,
Congress can pass statutes inconsistent with the executive agreement,
treaty, or presidential action; thereby, effectively overriding the execu-
tive agreement or treaty. Congress can pressure the President into
77. U.S. CONs'". art. I, § 7. For a thorough explanation of the required legislative process,
see ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, supra note 73, at ch. 10.
78. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936).
79. The Curtiss- Wright decision upheld a broad delegation of authority to the President on
the imposition of tariffs and embargoes against foreign goods. Id. at 333. The majority
opinion was written by Justice Sutherland, champion of state's rights during the period from
1933 to 1937. During this period, the Supreme Court used both the tenth amendment and the
separation of powers restriction on "excessive delegations" to limit the scope of federal
authority, in general, and the delegations of Congressional authority to the executive branch,
in particular. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(Congress cannot transfer essential legislative functions.); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is subject to
the guaranty of due process.); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (The
delegation of legislative power exceeded the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.). For an examination of the Court's shift in its view of the tenth amendment and
excessive delegation restrictions on the scope of' federal legislative authority in domestic
matters, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 73, at ch. 4.
80. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
81. Id. at 674. See Nowak & Rotunda, A Comment on the Creation and Resolution of a
"Non-Problem ": Dames & Moore v. Regan, The Foreign Affairs Power, and the Role of the
Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1982).
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changing a decision in the foreign affairs area by refusing to pass legis-
lation that the President needs, or favors. Congress can resort to the
ultimate weapon of impeachment.
Federalism and the separation of powers issues, at least when
they relate to foreign affairs, should be considered political questions
because the interaction of the President and Congress gives our coun-
try needed flexibility in foreign affairs and allows us to arrive at prac-
tical accommodations that best serve our national interests. There is
no indication in the text of the Constitution or its amendments that
the judiciary is authorized to create a fixed, "legal" delineation of the
roles of the President and Congress in foreign affairs.
The judiciary, in my opinion, should only restrict presidential or
congressional action in foreign affairs when specific, textual constitu-
tional limitations exist. The judiciary should not subject the Federal
Government to "international law," unless Congress, or the Presi-
dent, acting with congressional authorization, has clearly made our
country's actions in a specific area subject to international law, or to
international tribunals.8 2 If we allow the judiciary to use international
law to restrict the actions of either the President, or Congress, then
we would be abandoning the constitutional process. The Constitution
does not indicate that international law ranks with the Constitution,
as a limit on the actions of the elected branches of our federal
government.
The Supremacy Clause of article VI states that treaties are supe-
rior to state legislation, 3 but the Supreme Court has never attempted
to equate treaties with the Constitution itself. When a treaty conflicts
with a federal statute, the "last in time" prevails.8 4 Some legal schol-
ars would like the "last in time" rule reversed, so that treaties and,
perhaps, international law would prevail over federal statutes; others
82. This remark refers to the courts' power to subject the United States to treaties that are
not self-executing. Action in this area can only be taken by the executive or legislative
branches. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111, comment h (1986).
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI states:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
84. The Supreme Court established this principle in the nineteenth century. Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889). See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32
(1982) (Congressional acts should not be construed to violate the law of nations.); Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (Ambiguous congressional action does not repeal a
treaty.); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (If a treaty is last in time, it prevails.).
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have argued that the judiciary should consider treaties or interna-
tional law as theoretically superior to federal statutes even though the
judiciary lacks the authority and power to enforce international law. 5
Such views must be based on the jurisprudential argument that the
law of nations limits the actions of each country in the same way that
natural law limits the actions of every legislative or executive body.
This part of my speech will serve as a good point to recall the
dual-question approach to constitutional issues. The arguments for
making treaties or international law superior to our national legisla-
tion may be theoretically correct. There is no text in the Constitution,
however, that would justify judicial invalidation of executive or legis-
lative acts based on international law. It is not the judiciary's role to
pursue correct political philosophy, or concern itself with the conse-
quences of this country's treatybreaking or treatybending actions.
The arguments for use of natural law in the resolution of domestic
issues may find support in the liberty provisions of the fifth, four-
teenth, or ninth amendments; however, there is no textual basis in the
Constitution that makes international law superior to either presiden-
tial or congressional action.
The Constitution's specific checks on the federal powers, in arti-
cle I, section 9, the Bill of Rights, or elsewhere, are checks that could
arise in cases brought by individuals suffering a clear injury, or states
invoking a specific textual provision of the Constitution. Under no
circumstances should standing be granted to members of Congress to
attack executive agreements or executive actions in the area of foreign
affairs.86 An attempt by members of Congress to challenge executive
actions in court is no more than an attempt to have the judiciary
resolve separation of powers issues by considerations not set forth in
the Constitution. Indeed, such actions will almost certainly be
brought by persons who are in a minority, or a slim majority, in Con-
gress. If members of Congress who oppose the executive action are in
85. For overviews of, and insights into, the debate on this issue, see Henkin, Lexical
Priority or "Political Question'" A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV. 524 (1987); Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny,
100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional
Power and International Law: The Exceptions to the Last In Time Rule and the Primacy of
Custom, 28 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 393 (1988); Westen, The Place of Foreign Treaties in the Courts
of the United States: A Reply to Louis Henkin, 101 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1987). Author's note:
I took the liberty of adding these citations to these excellent articles in this law review version
of the Federalist Symposium. Three of the articles were published after the date of the
symposium and were not relied upon in the preparation of my remarks.
86. Lower courts are divided on the issue of whether members of Congress should be able
to bring suit to enforce or challenge federal statutes or executive actions. The Supreme Court,
however, has not definitively ruled on this matter. For citations to the cases in this area, see R.
ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 73, at § 2.13(f)(4).
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a clear majority, then they could take action to force the President to
give in to their will. The granting of congressional standing would
give losers in the political process the chance to unite with the judici-
ary to overrule actions endorsed by the President and a majority of
Congress and that do not conflict with any specific check on federal
power set forth in the Constitution or its amendments.
In cases where the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, the Court
should always uphold executive agreements, absent any clear conflict
between the executive agreement and a specific provision in a treaty, a
statute, or the Constitution, or its amendments. This position goes
well beyond the presumption of validity of executive agreements,
endorsed by the Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan." The basis for
judicial invalidation of executive agreements that violate specific pro-
visions of the Constitution is too obvious to require further explana-
tion. The rationale for court enforcement of the terms of a federal
statute, or a treaty, over an executive agreement is quite simple: Only
those two processes are clearly recognized in the Constitution. The
absence of reference to executive agreements in the Constitution,
however, does not give the Supreme Court the authority to restrict the
scope of executive agreements or the use of executive agreements as
alternatives to treaties. Because the Constitution sets forth the legisla-
tive and treatymaking processes, and does not mention executive
agreements, the Court prefers federal statutes and treaties to executive.
actions.
A court is justified in invalidating an executive agreement only
when there is a clear conflict between the executive action and the
specific words of a federal statute, treaty, or the Constitution or its
amendments. For example, if a bank is confronted by a claim to spe-
cific funds in the bank from person A, who claims the money under an
executive agreement, and person B, who claims the funds under a fed-
eral statute or treaty, the need arises for a judicial determination
regarding who gets the money. Assume that a court has jurisdiction
in the "Bank vs. A vs. B" case and that the executive agreement
clearly conflicts with a federal statute or treaty. The judiciary must
then base its ruling on the statute or treaty and award the money to
person B. If, however, the federal statute or treaty is unclear, the
judiciary must uphold the executive agreement and award the money
to person A.
I realize that my view of the judiciary's role in defining the treaty
power and federal authority in foreign affairs removes the judiciary
from a vital function that our nation may appear to need in times of
87. 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 81, at 1155.
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international strife, or when the scope of federal power is unclear, or
when the President and Congress are deadlocked. The Supreme
Court acts within its proper sphere only when it enforces specific
checks on the federal power similar to article I, section 9, and the Bill
of Rights, or when it enforces specific treaty or statutory provisions.
Furthermore, the interaction between the President and Congress-
the political process-is better suited than the judicial process to give
us a clear definition of the scope of federal power in foreign affairs and
the division of federal power between the executive and legislative
branches. The judiciary has no special wisdom in foreign affairs, and
it is not needed to keep federal power in check. To paraphrase Judge
Learned Hand: If this country is committed to constitutional princi-
ples and justice, we will not need the Court to save us in those times
of national turmoil or international problems. If this country turns its
back on constitutional principles, however, no court will be able to
save us.
88
IV. GROVER JOSEPH REES
Hardly anyone would disagree with the observation that "during
the past 200 years ... the executive branch, has increasingly domi-
nated the treaty process."89 Nor is it easy to find fault with Professor
Koh's argument that such domination was not contemplated by those
who framed and ratified the Constitution.9° With his selection of the
Reagan administration as an example of a uniquely voracious and cre-
ative usurper of legislative prerogatives, 91 however, it is not so difficult
to disagree. It gets even easier, for in any parade of imperial executive
horribles, the President's refusal to be bound by a senate resolution
92
interpreting a treaty93 fifteen years after its ratification must surely be
88. Judge Hand's remark seems particularly appropriate when considering the need for
judicial review of congressional or presidential action in foreign affairs. The quotation before
my paraphrasing read as follows:
[T]his much I think I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit of
moderation is gone, no court can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes,
no court need save; that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting
upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.
H. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 164 (I.
Dilliard 3d ed. 1960). This quotation is from the reprinted version of a 1942 speech by Judge
Hand, entitled "The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization." Id. at 155.
89. Remarks of Harold Hongju Koh, supra p.107.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. S. Res. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S3140-45 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1987).
93. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-USSR, 23 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
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regarded as a sideshow. The main event, in my opinion, has been the
entire circumvention of the constitutional role of the Senate by the use
of executive agreements.
A. Treaty Interpretation
In most conflicts between coordinate branches of government, it
is hard to tell the aggrandizer from the aggrandizee. Boundary dis-
putes between the co-holders of a shared power are inevitable. In the
case of a dispute between the President and the Senate over their
respective roles in the treaty process, the scope of reasonable disagree-
ment is widened by the impracticality of judicial resolution of such
conflicts.
This impracticality, in turn, has to do with the difficulty of get-
ting such disputes into court without mangling some of our tradi-
tional ideas about what constitutes a lawsuit. It should be
distinguished from what is known as the political question doctrine.
In its pure form that doctrine represents a gaping hole in the principle
of Marbury v. Madison:" It posits certain "sensitive" areas in which
courts should not "second guess" a result reached in the rough and
tumble of the political arena, even when this result would otherwise
be held to infringe private rights.9 Even without the political ques-
tion doctrine, however, disputes over the distribution of the treaty
power will generally be nonjusticiable precisely because they are not
about private rights. Rather, they concern institutional prerogatives
for which the Constitution provides safeguards other than judicial
review. 9
6
These safeguards themselves consist of entrenched institutional
arrangements. In battles over prerogative-as King Charles would
have known if he had listened to Professor Nowak-legislatures have
94. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
95. See Henkin, Is There A Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599 (1976).
Professor Henkin stated:
A meaningful political question doctrine . . . implies something more and
different: that some issues which prima facie and by usual criteria would seem to
be for the courts, will not be decided by them but, extra-ordinarily, left for
political decisions.... [T]he courts say to the petitioner in effect, "Although you
may indeed be aggrieved by an action of government, although the action may
indeed do violence to the Constitution, it involves a political question which is
not justiciable, not given to us to review."
Id.
96. See remarks of John Nowak, supra p. 117. Some treaties and other international
agreements do include provisions that create or modify private rights. If a plaintiff can show
that he has been deprived of life, liberty, or property by what he claims to be a violation of
such a provision, it may be appropriate for a court to interpret the agreement or even to decide
whether it has been adopted in accordance with law.
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many weapons at their disposal. Assuming a reasonably tenacious
legislature and a chief executive who is even minimally law-abiding,
recourse to the courts is an altogether unnecessary addition to any
arsenal that includes the power not to appropriate funds. And if an
Executive were audacious enough to ignore an unambiguous exercise
of the sort of power Congress can wield on its own, the option of
going to court would not seem a very useful one.
Each branch of government is sometimes obliged to interpret the
Constitution and the laws for itself. This happens whenever the Leg-
islature or Executive is thinking about doing something that has not
been declared lawful by a court. 97 In most cases the legislative or
executive interpretation is tentative: Anyone who believes that the
result of such interpretation deprives him of life, liberty, or property
can try to persuade the courts to adopt a contrary interpretation that
will then bind the other branches of government.
When a legislative or executive action impinges not on life, lib-
erty, or property but on the perceived power of another branch of
government, the competing entities' own interpretations of their pow-
ers and limitations matter more. The President and the members of
Congress have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution.9" The prob-
lem is that people have different ideas about what the Constitution
and other laws, including treaties, demand. Since the courts will not
ordinarily order either the Legislature or the Executive to recede from
its position, each branch may feel free-indeed, may feel obliged-to
conduct its own operations consistently with its own considered inter-
pretation of the Constitution and its own best judgment. Occasional
conflict, or at least impasse, seems inevitable.
International relations is not the exclusive preserve of the Execu-
tive, but the conduct of such relations comprehends some functions
that are executive in nature. One such function is negotiating with
foreign governments. In the course of such negotiations, the Presi-
dent must look to the constraints imposed by existing treaties and
must form an opinion about their meaning. In the case with the
delightful name Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States,99 the
Supreme Court held that the President was not bound by a senate
resolution declaring retrospectively what the Senate understood a
treaty to mean at the time it was ratified.l" Such a resolution might
97. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
98. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
99. 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
100. Id. at 180. The Supreme Court stated: "The meaning of the treaty cannot be
controlled by subsequent explanations of some of those who may have voted to ratify it." Id.
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or might not be persuasive evidence of what the treaty did mean, but
if the President is not persuaded then he is not bound.
The power "to say what the law is"'1°1 comprehends a duty to try
to figure out what the law means.1"2 In arriving at legal interpreta-
tions, the President and Congress have the same duty that a court
would have to consider all the evidence and all the arguments. This is
especially true when the interpretation is one that is unlikely to be
"second-guessed" by the courts, such as an interpretation of an anti-
ballistic missile treaty. Insofar as Judge Sofaer can be taken to mean
that the deliberations of the Senate when it advises and consents to a
treaty contribute to the meaning of the treaty only when manifested in
explicit formal "reservations" and "understandings,"10 3 I part com-
pany with him. A treaty is the supreme law of the land"° in part
because the Senate voted for it.105 Evidence of what lawmakers
thought they were voting for should be respected, regardless of its
label. Of course, the evidence alluded to by Judge Sofaer is also
important. The Senate was only one of the entities whose consent was
necessary to the formation of the treaty. It also matters what the
President thought and what the Russians thought. This is only to say,
however, that evidence of Senate understandings not formally so des-
ignated is not always dispositive, not that such evidence is irrelevant.
It is important to remember that Senators and Representatives
are no more bound by the President's interpretations than he is by
theirs. The successful conduct of foreign relations, as Professor Koh
reminds us, sometimes requires the participation of the Legislature. °0
When a question of legal interpretation not subject to judicial resolu-
tion becomes relevant to the conduct of a legislative function, the
interpretation accepted by a majority of the legislators becomes the
governing one. On questions whose regulation requires the appropri-
ation of funds, whichever body adopts the most restrictive interpreta-
tion has the power to insist on it. ' If fifty-one Senators really believe
that development and testing of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
would violate our treaty obligations, it is within their power to ensure
that such development and testing will not happen. They cannot bind
101. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
102. Indeed, Marbury spoke of the interpretive function not as a "power" but as a "duty."
Id. The duty exists because constitutional provisions have meaning and because that meaning
was meant to be "a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature." Id. at 180.
103. See remarks of Abraham D. Sofaer, supra p. 106.
104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
105. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
106. See remarks of Harold Hongju Koh, supra p. 107.
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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the President to their interpretation with a "sense of the Senate" reso-
lution any more than he could bind them with a "sense of the Presi-
dent" statement."°8 But no weapon can be built without an
appropriation, and no appropriations bill can pass with fifty-one Sena-
tors voting against it.1°9
Professor Koh finds it disturbing that such legislative intransi-
gence may be the only effective remedy for executive expansionism.
His objection is not that non-cooperation as a technique of policy-
making is unconstitutional in any sense of the word-for Professor
Koh is devoted to the framers, and the framers were devoted to
checks and balances-but that it makes it harder for the United States
to become involved in multilateral agreements and international
organizations. 1 0
Indeed, this turns out to be the principal way in which the Rea-
gan administration's attitude toward the treaty power is uniquely bad.
Earlier administrations "had largely won" the "battle for dominance
over treatymaking" by "using a variety of techniques, particularly the
executive agreement, to lead the United States into the era of multi-
lateralism."' 1 The Reagan administration, on the other hand, has
used many of these same techniques to slow or reverse that trend, a
phenomenon that Professor Koh calls "treatybreaking" and
"treatybending." 12
Reasonable people can differ, however, on the merits of being led
into multilateral eras. In any case, most questions about the demarca-
tion of legislative and executive power are questions of constitutional
law' 3 that ought to be judged on some other criteria than whether
they get us into more treaties and organizations, even good ones.
Applying constitutional rather than ideological criteria, senatorial
irridentism with regard to the treaty power could find more obvious
targets than the President's disagreement with the Senate--or his con-
108. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 180 (1901).
109. Voting against an appropriations bill is, of course, a higher stakes enterprise than
voting for a sense of the Senate resolution. Legislators frequently vote for bills containing
items they dislike (and Executives frequently sign such bills) when it has become procedurally
impossible to separate these items from other items they deem desirable and important. But
this is precisely the point: The Constitution gives each branch of government limited powers.
For the Legislature as well as for the Executive, decisions about which points of controversy
are important enough to insist upon will often be difficult. If a branch decides not to use its
constitutional powers in order to get its way on a particular question, the power to decide the
question may shift to another branch.
110. See remarks of Harold Hongju Koh, supra p. 107.
111. Id. at pp. 108-09.
112. Id. at p. 107.
113. This is usually referred to in multilateral circles as "municipal law."
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duct of executive functions in accordance with his own views rather
than someone else's-on a close question of treaty interpretation.
B. Executive Agreements
Concern about the erosion of senate authority to participate in
treatymaking would seem more productively directed at executive
agreements. Such agreements are constitutionally unproblematic
when they are genuinely incidental to a power delegated to the Execu-
tive by the Constitution. Actions the President has the clear authority
to take-whether or not anyone else wishes him to-such as receiving
ambassadors 1 4 or removing our troops from foreign soil, 1I surely do
not become unconstitutional at the moment Canada consents to them.
Executive agreements on such matters as postal relations and interna-
tional trade, that do not bind the United States to do anything that
Congress could not have done by legislation,'1 6 would also seem to be
valid when authorized or ratified by Congress.
There must, however, be something that can be done in a treaty,
the President and two-thirds of the Senate concurring, which could
not be done by the President acting alone. This would seem to be the
narrowest plausible interpretation of the constitutional commitment
to the Senate of a share in the treaty power." 7 When the Constitution
prohibits a conviction for treason except on the testimony of two wit-
nesses" it surely must be construed also to prohibit the creation of a
crime called quasi-treason, which is identical to treason in every
respect, except that conviction requires only one witness. Similarly, a
provision requiring that treaties receive the advice and consent of the
Senate is meaningless if it does not preclude, or at least limit, resort to
quasi-treaties that are exactly like treaties except that they have not
received the advice and consent of the Senate.
One such quasi-treaty was the Litvinov Assignment. It consisted
of an exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and the Soviet
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and it was recognized by the Supreme
Court as the " 'Law of the Land.' ""s In United States v. Belmont 20
and United States v. Pink,'2 ' the Court held this agreement to have
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
116. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8.
117. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
118. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
119. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
120. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
121. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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modified the law that would otherwise have determined the owner-
ship of property in New York.
Belmont and Pink were the result of President Roosevelt's deci-
sion in 1933 to recognize the Soviet Union.122 Prior to that time the
Soviet government had purported to nationalize various assets,
including some that were located in the United States. 123 The courts
of New York had held that the assets located in that state belonged to
their original owners rather than to the Soviet proletariat. 124 On the
same day that the United States recognized the Soviet Union, Presi-
dent Roosevelt agreed with Commissar Litvinov that the United
States would become the assignee of all Soviet claims against assets
located in the.United States.1 25 The United States then relitigated the
ownership of these assets. The New York courts followed their earlier
holdings: The United States stood in the shoes of its assignor, and as
a matter of property and contract law the money still belonged to the
people who owned it before the assignment.
1 26
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and held the
Litvinov Assignment to have the effect of a federal law or a treaty,
although it did not have the advice and consent of the Senate. 127 This
was partly because the assignment was regarded as incidental to rec-
ognition of the Soviet Union,1 28 and partly because this is a big world
in which there are complex and delicate problems. In both Belmont
and Pink, the Court's language swept even more broadly than its
holding: "Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of foreign
relations requires no less" than that "[n]o such obstacle [as the com-
mon law of New York] can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of
relations between this country and another nation ... ," 129 Executive
agreements "have a similar dignity"'130 to that of treaties. With
122. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 211.
123. Id at 210.
124. Beha v. Russian Reinsurance Co. of Petrograd, 255 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E. 114 (1931).
125. See Letters between Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States (Nov. 15, 16, 1933), reprinted in II
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pun. No. 3663,
DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 804-14 (1933).
126. See United States v. Pink, 284 N.Y. 555, 32 N.E.2d 552 (1940); Moscow Fire Ins. Co.
v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939).
127. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) ("The powers of the President in
the conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent of the Senate, to
determine the public policy of the United States with respect to the Russian nationalization
decrees."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("[A]n international compact,
as this was, is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate.").
128. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 229; Belmont, 301 U.S. at.330.
129. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30.
130. Id at 230.
19ss1
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
regard to matters addressed by such agreements, "the State of New
York does not exist."'
31
It is tempting to argue that Pink and Belmont are limited to their
facts, in which the President's letter-writing power was held to invali-
date a mere state law rather than a federal statute or treaty. This
limitation, however, is inconsistent with the reasoning of the opinions.
If executive agreements are the supreme law of the land, 132 then they
supersede not only state laws but also prior federal statutes and trea-
ties. In 1953, a circuit court held an executive agreement illegal on
the ground that it conflicted with a prior federal statute. 133 The case,
however, has been criticized as inconsistent with Belmont since it
denies executive agreements equal dignity with treaties. 134 It is gener-
ally conceded that the domestic effects of an executive agreement
would be overridden by a later federal statute, 35 but this concession is
made precisely because it also applies to the domestic effects of
treaties.
The doctrine may be even broader. Pink and Belmont relied on a
power whose existence had recently been announced in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.:136 "the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal gov-
ernment in the field of international relations."
137
The President's "sole organ" power, according to Curtiss-
Wright, exists apart from the powers specifically granted to him by
the Constitution. It consists of certain "attributes of sovereignty"
that are implicit in the concept of nationhood. 138  They are not
granted by the Constitution,' 39 but were derived from the King of
England."'4 No nation is completely sovereign without them. 1 '
These attributes simply have to be somewhere. Since they clearly do
131. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
132. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 230.
133. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
134. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 186 (1972); Mathews,
The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International Agreements, 64 YALE L. J.
345, 386-87 (1955); see also Etlimar Societe Anonyme of Casablanca v. United States, 106 F.
Supp. 191 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (An executive agreement is the supreme law of the land, effectively
amending prior federal law that would have allowed the plaintiff to bring an action in federal
court for the price of property taken by the United States.).
135. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
136. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
137. Id at 320.
138. Id at 318.
139. Id




not belong to the states, they must belong to the federal govern-
ment. 42 Moreover, the Court's paean to the President as a "sole
organ" has been interpreted to mean not just that the federal govern-
ment possesses such extraconstitutional attributes of sovereignty as
formerly belonged to the Crown, but that many of them belong exclu-
sively to the President.
43
In my opinion, the argument of Curtiss-Wright is not merely
unconstitutional but anti-constitutional. This term is selected not as
an index of the depth of my disagreement but as a precise descriptive
term for the Court's method of analysis. Curtiss-Wright is not like
other decisions that might be criticized for giving an unduly loose
construction to the enumerated powers of the government. On the
contrary, by positing a source of power apart from, and prior to, the
Constitution, it simply denies the constitutional premise that the
national government is one of limited and enumerated powers."44 As
extended by Belmont and Pink, the argument then locates some of the
extraconstitutional attributes of sovereignty-not only the unenumer-
ated ones, but also an enumerated power that the Constitution
appears to have delegated partly to the Senate-in the Executive
alone, not so much on the basis of any further analysis as because it is
in the nature of things.'45
All of this amounts to the denial of what I take to be the central
theme of the Constitution: the limitation and distribution of sover-
eignty, perhaps even in ways that might have resulted in a govern-
ment less powerful and efficient than King George or Metternich
would have thought appropriate to a modern state. The provision
giving the Senate a veto power over treaties suggests one way in which
our constitutional republic was intended to differ from other govern-
ments. Yet Curtiss-Wright affirmed "the power to make such interna-
tional agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional
sense,"'" since otherwise the United States would not be "equal" to
142. Id.
143. Id. at 319 ("[Tihe President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation.").
144. See id. at 315-16.
145. See id. at 319. Belmont seems not only to have been the first case to rely on Curtiss-
Wright, but also to have announced an important extension of it. The term "sole organ," as
used in the sources cited by the Court in Curtiss-Wright, meant only that Congress could not
tell the President how to conduct negotiations. Id. The Curtiss-Wright Court used the term in
a different but not necessarily more ambitious sense, to justify a delegation of power by
Congress to the President. Id. Belmont seems simply to assume that if the President is the
"sole organ," he can make rules of law that have domestic effects without any delegation from
Congress. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
146. Id at 318.
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"other members of the international family."1 47
If the legal effect of the Litvinov letter was attributable to an
extraconstitutional power of the President to be the sole organ of the
United States in matters affecting foreign nations, then it arguably
invalidated not only contrary state law and prior federal law, but also
any subsequent federal statute. The "sole organ" power was not said
to exist only at the sufferance of Congress. On the contrary, it was
described as both "plenary" and "exclusive."' 48
Another justification offered for the Litvinov Assignment, some-
what narrower than the "sole organ" reasoning, was that the assign-
ment was incidental to the recognition of the Soviet Union. 49 Since
the President has the constitutional power to decide what government
is to be regarded as the government of Russia, he also has the power
"to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recogni-
tion."' 5 ° This includes the power to remove "impediments to friendly
relations.'"" In other words, the power to recognize a foreign gov-
ernment includes the implied power to abolish any domestic law to
which the foreign government objects.
It should be kept in mind that the only thing the Constitution
has to say about recognition of foreign governments is that the Presi-
dent "shall receive ambassadors."' 52 It is not impossible that the
receiving ambassadors clause was meant simply as a road map for the
ambassadors in question, telling them where to report when they got
to Washington. Ours was to be a new form of government, and at the
time of the Constitutional Convention many such practical questions
had yet to be resolved. To say that the President receives ambassa-
dors is to give him one of the attributes of a head of state. It does not
say that he is, for all purposes, the head of government. In England,
the Queen receives ambassadors, but she does not decide which of two
competing ambassadors she will receive. The power to choose
between rival governments is no more obviously implicit in the receiv-
ing ambassadors clause than in the treaty power, or in the power of
Congress to make such laws as are necessary and proper to carry out
the powers vested in the government.
53
Even if the power to receive ambassadors does imply the power
147. Id
148. Id
149. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
150. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 229.
151. Id at 231.
152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
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to recognize governments, it hardly follows that the designated
receiver also has absolute discretion to modify domestic law whenever
this would lead to better relations with another nation. As Justice
Stone pointed out in his dissent in Pink, the New York law was not an
officious attempt by a state to meddle in international affairs. The
property was located in New York, and the state court was obliged to
decide to whom the property belonged. In refusing to give domestic
effect to a foreign transfer of title, the New York court was following
a rule of long standing in the courts of England, in the other state
courts, and in the Supreme Court itself.154 Refusal to give effect to
such transfers had "[n]ever ... been considered inconsistent with the
most friendly relations with the recognized foreign government, or
even with an active military alliance at the time of the transfer."'
155
And yet President Roosevelt was able, by writing a letter, to turn this
question of state law into a question with respect to which "the State
of New York does not exist."' 156 Although the power to partly abolish
New York is not without appeal, its inclusion within the power to
receive ambassadors requires a justification not given.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Goldwater v. Carter15 7 carries the
"incident to recognition" rationale even further. Goldwater con-
cerned a treaty with the Nationalist Chinese government. 5 " Presi-
dent Carter decided to recognize a new Chinese government and
therefore found it necessary to break relations with the old one. 59
When we had entered into the treaty with the Nationalists, however,
there were already two rival Chinese governments. The treaty
ensconced as "the supreme law of the land" the proposition that we
would do certain things for the Nationalist Chinese precisely because
of the existence of the rival government.
The treaty with Nationalist China also provided that the United
States could terminate it-not the President, but "the United States."
It said nothing about the internal procedure the United States should
follow in order to terminate it. The usual way in which a law is
repealed is by another law: a subsequent statute or treaty. And yet
the implied power of the President to make "incidental" law was
154. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 246-47 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
155. Id at 246.
156. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
157. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
158. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-Republic of China, 6 U.S.T. 433,
T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
159. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Although Justice Brennan's
opinion was technically a dissent, he reached the same result as the majority on a different
theory.).
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found to allow him to undo a deliberate "non-incidental" decision
made in accordance with the procedures provided explicitly by the
Constitution for the making of supreme law with respect to interna-
tional relations. This is even more water than the receiving ambassa-
dors clause was formerly made to carry.
There is a third possible justification for executive agreements,
even when they concern matters outside the scope of the President's
enumerated powers and have not been authorized by statute. This
justification is found in Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer."6 Justice Jackson's argument is that if
the President has done something affecting international relations and
Congress has not complained about it, then Congress is deemed
implicitly to have ratified the President's action.16 This analysis
seems far more "moderate" and far more consistent with the idea that
the power to make international agreements is a shared power, than
either of the two other arguments I have described. It leads, however,
to another thicket: Is a "congressional-executive" agreement always a
complete constitutional substitute for a treaty?
Justice Holmes found it "obvious that there may be matters of
the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Con-
gress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act
could." 162 In other words, there are some matters which might come
to affect our foreign relations, and yet, which are outside the scope of
the enumerated powers of Congress. Assuming that these matters are
also outside the enumerated powers of the President, the only way to
reach an international agreement on them is by treaty. The problem
with attempting to apply this analysis today is that Holmes left the
Supreme Court too soon. It is difficult to imagine anything that might
conceivably become the subject of an international agreement that the
Court would not, in accordance with its current body of precedents,
feel obliged to shoehorn into some enumerated power other than the
treaty power.
This is not to say that the President should choose between a
treaty, a congressional-executive agreement, and a sole executive
agreement on the basis of what he thinks he can get away with. It has
long been argued, for instance, that the President and the Senate
would be acting unconstitutionally if they made a treaty with a com-
plaisant foreign nation on a domestic matter that was of no genuine
concern to that nation, simply in order to eliminate the need for the
160. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
161. Id at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
162. Missouri v. Holland, 250 U.S. 415, 433 (1920).
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concurrence of the House of Representatives. One scan pose similar
questions about an end run around the constitutional requirement
that a treaty must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the Senate.
This end run would be in the form of a statute authorizing an execu-
tive agreement to do something Congress and the President would
never want to do except in order to settle a dispute with another
nation.
Precisely because the courts will be unlikely to overrule its judg-
ment on this kind of question, the Executive has an unusually strong
duty to police itself. Suppose that the President believes he could per-
suade a simple majority in each house of Congress to approve the
resolution of a dispute with a foreign nation but doubts he could per-
suade two-thirds of the Senate. Suppose further that he believes the
proposed resolution to be good for the Nation and for the world. He
might nevertheless have a duty to present it to the Senate as a treaty.
The President must abide by the answer to the constitutional ques-
tion, or by his honest estimate of the answer, even if this answer is
unlikely to be imposed on him by the courts.
We often hear that the Constitution is not a suicide pact. By this
it is not usually meant that the country will literally be destroyed if
the speaker's views do not prevail. More often it amounts to a back-
hand concession that there may be some minor constitutional
problems with what the speaker proposes to do, but that we had bet-
ter do them anyway because, otherwise, things will be one hell of a
mess. In other words, people who say the Constitution is not a sui-
cide pact often mean that it is not an inconvenience pact. The Consti-
tution, however, is precisely an inconvenience pact. That is the
definition of a constitution. Where it imposes limits, even inconve-
nient ones, on the conduct of foreign relations, these limits should
be enforced at least in the forum of executive and congressional
conscience.
V. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SPEAKER: I am not sure from Judge Rees' analysis whether he
would agree with Professor Nowak. I don't think Professor Koh
would.
JUDGE REES: I have written against the political question
doctrine. I think the political question doctrine as a separate doc-
trine, that has announced that if some part of the Constitution is not
very important to me and mine, the courts should stay out of it and
should let the political process control-that is an audacious and dan-
gerous doctrine. The political question doctrine has been invoked
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most frequently in areas in which the Constitution was clearly being
violated, but there was no way around it except for the courts to
abstain entirely. I think that the doctrine is impossible to reconcile
with the premise of Marbury v. Madison, with which premise I agree.
I thought that was what Professor Nowak was going to say when
I heard the preface of his speech. He hedged about it, however, with
enough qualifications that I think I agree with him. One reason the
political question doctrine has become necessary, or is thought to be
necessary, is the erosion of all the traditional limitations on what gets
into court. Most cases that have been decided as political question
cases either should not have gotten into the court because of lack of
standing, ripeness, or mootness; or once in court, the plaintiffs clearly
should not have won because they did not state cognizable claims.
SPEAKER: Judge Rees, would you two [Judge Rees and Profes-
sor Nowak] disagree on the Pink and Belmont cases?
JUDGE REES: It is always hard to tell whether the Court is
talking about its decisionmaking power, or whether it is talking about
the merits. I interpret Pink and Belmont as having more to do with
the merits. The Court did not just say that the President may be act-
ing unconstitutionally, but we are going to stay out of it. Rather, the
Court said that the President somehow acted constitutionally because
he has got this vast implicit executive power. In that case, I would
say the Court should have reached the merits and held that the Presi-
dent did not have that power.
PROFESSOR NOWAK: I would point out that there was no
specific federal statute regarding who owned the property. The Bel-
mont and Pink opinions noted that the creditors' claims had been sat-
isfied. Thus, none of the property had, in fact, been taken without just
compensation. Otherwise, the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment would have been an enforceable limitation in the execu-
tive agreement at issue. But, in the absence of any specific conflict
with the statute, or a taking of property under the just compensation
clause, the executive agreement could not be invalidated. I agree with
Judge Rees, in that the Court's opinion should have simply stated that
there was no basis for judicial invalidation, and therefore, the federal
action prevailed. But the actual Court opinion indicated that the cor-
rect view of original framing of the Constitution was contrary to
Judge Rees' view. Thus, we do differ to some extent.
PROFESSOR KOH: If the question is whether the courts can
resolve treaty questions, then that reminds me of the Southern Baptist
minister who is asked: "Do you believe in total immersion baptism?"
He says: "Believe in it? Well, hell, I have seen it done."
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Do we believe that the Court can resolve treaty questions? Well,
hell, we've seen it done in a whole variety of cases. The important
thing to notice, however, is that almost every time the Court has ruled
on treaty questions at the President's request, it has ruled in favor of
the President. When somebody else has challenged the President's
conduct, the Court has usually not reached the merits. 16
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SPEAKER: Professor Koh, you accused Judge Sofaer and the
administration of illegally bending the ABM Treaty. If I understood
Judge Sofaer's last point, it was that it would be inconceivable for the
ABM Treaty to develop inconsistent obligations on the Soviet Union
and the United States. That is to say, the same document, like a con-
tract, could not impose obligations that were asymmetrical. The
Soviet Union could not possibly be obligated by the communications
between the Executive and the Senate after the signing of the treaty.
Therefore, the communications between the Executive and the Senate
could not modify the agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Do you agree with that Professor Koh?
JUDGE SOFAER: As a matter of international law?
SPEAKER: Yes.
PROFESSOR KOH: In commenting on the ABM reinterpreta-
tion debate, I did not spend a lot of time on the merits. The main
point that I was making was that the net effect of the administration's
reinterpretation of that Treaty has been counterproductive to the
executive branch in its dealings with both Congress and our allies.
But if you want to go to the merits of the reinterpretation, the simple
point to be made is that the language and structure of the treaty
clearly favor the so-called "narrow" interpretation. This seems to be
the belief of six Secretaries of Defense, eight of the nine negotiators of
the ABM Treaty, and President Reagan during his first term. If the
treaty is clear on its face, then the negotiating history should be
irrelevant.
Even if the negotiating history was relevant, then the question
would become: "Why is the negotiating history relevant, rather than
the negotiating record to which the Senate advised and consented?"
Just imagine the following scenario, which is essentially what Judge
Sofaer puts to us. The Soviet Union says: "We really wanted a nar-
row interpretation of the Treaty, but the U.S. didn't want one, and
therefore, we do not have to abide by the narrow view and are entitled
to develop radar at Krasnoyarsk." We would say: "Where did you
get your evidence about our intent?" By making arguments about
163. See Koh, supra note 26, at 1306-17.
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what the Soviets intended, I think we have opened up a Pandora's
box. Such an approach will make the negotiating record relevant to
every treaty. This means that on the INF Treaty, 6' 100 Senators are
going to be digging into six years of INF negotiating records and plac-
ing understandings on every line of text. Needless to say, I find the
prospect of this sort of treaty interpretation extremely disturbing.
JUDGE SOFAER: There have been a lot of extremely errone-
ous things said about the treaty at a time when the administration was
still putting its case together because the early statements by some
administration officials caused a lot of legislators to get into high gear
before the administration had really stated its position.
Our position, however, is not at all as Professor Koh has said.
Krasnoyarsk has absolutely nothing to do with any of this. Krasno-
yarsk was a violation long before 1985. The Soviets have never
accepted the restrictive interpretation. People should pay attention to
what is going on in the world, rather than calling an interpretation,
that has never been accepted by the other side in a bilateral treaty, a
"traditional" interpretation. It is the most preposterous characteriza-
tion I have heard in my professional life.
The Soviet Union did articulate throughout the negotiations, and
right up to 1978, when we started publishing our plans for strategic
defense, a view of the ABM Treaty that presented a very limited scope
for restrictions under the treaty-limited, in that it did not cover
unknown devices. Thereafter, the Soviets started to articulate a much
more restrictive view of the treaty than we had ever accepted, and
that is why I referred to Ambassador Smith's statement in the Senate
hearings. Gerry Smith said we could develop things until we got to
field testing. When we presented the Soviet Union with that theory in
1981, they flatly rejected it.
Senator Nunn, a serious and honorable man, was on a television
interview just a week ago. When he was presented with the assertion
that "the Soviets have always accepted the restrictive interpretation,"
he stopped the interviewer and said: "Now wait a second. We all
know the Soviet Union's position on the ABM Treaty is absurd. They
have always had this absurd position that we could not even do
research and laboratory testing." In that context, is it inappropriate
for the President to ask his lawyer: "What is the scope of my obliga-
tion under this treaty?" Of course not.
164. See supra note 61.
[Vol. 43:101
